TO: Drawy, and Chan Memo/Reply From Dept. Inti. Relation JOSHUA LEDERBERG 2 Habour Ugiv. Thrut Perceptions in Init's Platicis foregoe for many issue of laystanding of arocational intrust to me, and I thoule you for it! I was startly enough at the unacks noted on p. col (attack) that I made some further enquisies. Telford Toylor, in Minister takes a mue comprehending porture; but is not willing to be so entired. Slean's memore are sey-cutieil, but stellier planty of objective grounds for france the luftwoffe. and yn may be jutensted in tel- Lety's (professioned) assessment which should be coupled with many accounts of Butain's lash of preparation fordifferse

against an attack, so that uniscented bombie

eue: El Cery

ORIG. RETAINED - REPLY FO

could still do heavy damage.

Memo/Reply From

TO:

JOSHUA LEDERBERG

So, while British leaders can be faulted for their hard-hearted commitment to reasons—

ment 1938-1939 (though how can a 4.5.

national theorestone on this essue!), I

suggest you reexamine the local of

central analysia: One hopes the shew

wolume of strategic-analytic affect forly

can arguer our clarity of policy judy
ment in like proportion!)